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Notice Due to Stealth1 and other Foreign
Defendants after Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk2 and under
the Hague Service Convention 3
I. INTRODUCTION
A foreign corporation may extract profits, control resources, and
expand its market share by operating in the United States through
affiliated domestic corporations.4 Quite often, such activity meets the
"doing business" 5 or "minimum contacts ' 6 tests and subjects the
foreign corporation to the in personam 7 jurisdiction of United States
1. Multinational corporations operate in the United States by stealth. They are not unlike
the stealth bomber, which furtively flies over enemy territory, invisibly approaching its target,
all the while being immune to the defenses of its opponent. Likewise, the foreign parent
assembles goods overseas, sells them through United States "affiliates," all the while avoiding
stepping inside the United States. By not being located here, the multinational corporation
remains immune to domestic service of process.
2. 108 S. Ct. 2104 (1988).
3. Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in
Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S.
No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Hague Service Convention or Convention].
4. An affiliated domestic corporation means a subsidiary, distributor, or other corporate
entity which allows the foreign defendant to operate in the forum without being located there.
5. With respect to service of process statutes on foreign corporations, "doing business"
means the equivalent of carrying on, conducting, or managing business. A foreign corporation
is "doing business," and thus amenable to service within the state, if the activities of the
foreign corporation within the state warrant the inference that it is present in the state. BLACK'S
LAW DICTONARY 433 (5th ed. 1979).
6. "Minimum contacts" is the personal jurisdiction doctrine under which a court may
exert in personam jurisdiction over a foreign corporation if that foreign corporation conducts
certain minimum levels of business activity in the forum which seeks to assert jurisdiction.
See International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
7. In personam jurisdiction is the power which a court exerts over the defendant itself,
in contrast to the court's power over the defendant's property (in rem). BLAcK's LAw
DICTiONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979).
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courts. Yet, a foreign corporation meeting the in personam jurisdic-
tion requirements of the United States Constitution is not necessarily
subject to service of process within the United States.
The situation described above may surprise the United States
plaintiff when she discovers that a foreign defendant cannot be
compelled to appear in a suit. Thus, the term caveat emptor, buyer
beware, frequently turns into caveat plaintiff. A plaintiff may buy
merchandise from what appears to be a United States company only
to find out later that the manufacturer she wants to sue is a foreign
corporation. This fact may seriously affect her ability to press her
case before a court in the United States. The situation envisaged here
can best be illustrated with the following scenario:
The plaintiff may purchase a Brand X car under state sales laws,
pay United States dollars to her local dealership, 9 and drive her
vehicle on United States roads. She will register it under state
regulations and have it repaired locally under a warranty guaranteed
under United States law.10 Finally, if she is in an accident in the
U.S., her liability will be determined under United States law. Con-
siderations of international service of process, which can be compli-
cated even in the simplest of cases, are the furthest from her mind."
Yet, if the car is defective, causing injury or death, our consumer-
turned-plaintiff may suddenly discover lurking in the background a
foreign manufacturer who can avoid service within the U.S. While
this defendant may be subject to the in personam jurisdiction of
U.S. courts, the plaintiff may find it difficult or impossible to serve
the foreign defendant within the United States or even abroad.
Current United States law typically forces the plaintiff to chase
this elusive foreign manufacturer abroad in order to serve it with
process. 12 Why should this be so, given that our plaintiff did not
8. For purposes of this Comment, the plaintiff may be either an individual or a business.
9. For example, Honda of America distributes automobiles made in Japan by Honda;
Geick v. American Honda Motor Co., 117 F.R.D. 123 (C.D. Ill. 1987); and Volkswagen of
America distributes automobiles made in Germany by Volkswagen of Germany.
10. For purposes of this Comment, United States laws may be either federal or state
laws.
11. In Cippolla v. Picard Porsche Audi, Inc., 496 A.2d 130 (R.I. 1985), Anita, the
plaintiff, bought a car distributed by Volkswagen of America, the wholly owned U.S. subsidiary
of Volkswagen of Germany. Anita sustained personal injuries when her Rabbit "stuck" in
reverse while she was driving. The court noted, "It is safe to say that as Anita 'barreled
rapidly in reverse across the road,' the supremacy clause of Article VI of the United States
Constitution never crossed her mind." Id. at 131.
12. This hypothetical situation is similar to that of the plaintiff in Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Schunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104 (1988). In Schlunk, the parents of the United
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consciously engage in any international transactions? How can it be
that the foreign defendant, who has purposefully availed himself of
the benefits and protections of the laws of the United States, suddenly
becomes unavailable for domestic service of process? What is the
logic of United States laws, such as the Rule of Cannon v. Cudahy
(hereinafter Rule of Cannon or Cannon), which give certain types
of foreign defendants, i.e., foreign parents of domestic subsidiaries,
immunity from being served domestically under United States service
statutes? "
A plaintiff may have to serve one of several different types of
foreign defendants. 14 However, for purposes of this discussion, the
defendants are classified into five types. The Type (A) defendant is
not operating in the United States and does not have sufficient
"minimum contacts" to be subject to in personam jurisdiction, but
through special circumstances, such as consent, the court may assert
jurisdiction anyway. 15 The Type (B) defendant operates in the United
States only occasionally and sporadically, such as by filling a single
or limited number of orders initiated by a U.S. buyer; this activity
States plaintiff were killed in a car accident while driving a German-made car in Illinois. The
plaintiff originally filed a wrongful death action against Volkswagen of America (hereinafter
VWOA), alleging that VWOA had designed and sold the defective, uncrashworthy car which
had caused the deaths of his parents. Plaintiff successfully served process on VWOA through
its registered agent for service of process in Illinois, C.T. Corporation. VWOA filed a timely
answer which denied it had designed or assembled the allegedly defective automobile. Id. at
2106. Then the plaintiff attempted to use the service on VWOA as substituted service on
Volkswagen of Germany (hereinafter VWAG), which owned and controlled Volkswagen of
America. Id.
13. Cannon is often cited for the general rule that the mere fact that a foreign parent
has a wholly owned, closely controlled subsidiary in the forum is insufficient to subject the
foreign parent to the in personan jurisdiction of the forum's courts. Cannon Manufacturing
Co. v. Cudahy Co., 267 U.S. 333, 336-37 (1925). Later courts analogized Cannon to hold
that the wholly owned, closely controlled subsidiary was not necessarily a proper "agent for
service of process." Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2111 n.**; Geick, 117 F.R.D. at 127. Consequently,
the Japanese foreign parent of a domestic wholly owned subsidiary escaped domestic service
of process within Illinois, even though Honda of Japan sold cars in Illinois. Id. at 124. Honda
of Japan probably should be subject to domestic service within Illinois since it sold cars in
that state. See Crose factor discussion infra notes 26-56 and accompanying text.
14. This Comment assumes that the defendant is located in one of the following countries
which have signed the Hague Service Convention: Antigua and Barbuda, Belgium, Botswana,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Seychelles, Spain,
Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, or the United States. For defendants in nonsignatory
countries, see Service of Process Abroad: A Nuts and Bolts Guide, 122 F.R.D. 63, 67-69
(1988) [hereinafter Service of Process Abroad]. The type of defendant discussed in this
Comment is either an individual or a foreign corporation, but most likely the latter. If the
target defendant is a foreign state or a political subdivision, see id. at 63.
15. This situation arose in Lemme v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 456
(E.D.N.Y. 1986), discussed infra notes 34-47 and accompanying text.
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incurs only the limited, specific jurisdiction for those causes of action
related to defendant's activities in the forum. 16 Type (C) defendants
are those who conduct continuous and systematic operations in the
United States, such as distributing products through U.S. distributors
or salesmen. Maintaining a distribution network incurs the general
jurisdiction of the forum under which the plaintiff may sue on any
cause of action. 17 Type (D) defendants are foreign parents of closely
controlled, wholly owned United States subsidiaries." Type (E) de-
fendants are those foreign corporations who operate in the United
States through partially owned (less than 100%) United States affil-
iates. It is assumed that in personam jurisdiction may be constitu-
tionally obtained over any of these types of foreign defendants. 19
16. See Newport Components v. NEC Home Electronics, 671 F. Supp. 1525, 1531-32
(C.D. Cal. 1987). Specific jurisdiction is a special, limited form of personal jurisdiction:
Specific jurisdiction is present where the cause-of-action relates to or "arises out
of" the defendant's contact with the forum state, and the minimum contacts
requirement is satisfied, even if the contact is a single act, as long as the contact
resulted from the defendant's purposeful conduct and not the unilateral activity of
the plaintiff or third person.
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1985). A forum may exert specific
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if the defendant has "purposefully directed" his
activities at a resident of the forum, Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774
(1984), and the cause of action arises from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those
activities in the forum. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408
(1984).
17. Newport Components, 671 F. Supp. at 1533-34. "General jurisdiction" over non-
resident defendants may be exercised even when the cause of action does not arise from or
relate to the defendant's purposeful contacts with the forum if the defendant's contacts with
the forum are "substantial" or "continuous and systematic." Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415.
General jurisdiction may come about when the defendant makes sales, solicits or engages in
business, has employees, is incorporated in the forum, or designates an agent for service of
process. Newport Components, 671 F. Supp. at 1534 (citations omitted).
18. This situation arose in Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104
(1988), where a German multinational parent, Volkswagen of Germany, operated in the United
States through Volkswagen of America, a wholly owned, closely controlled United States
subsidiary. Id. at 2106-07.
19. The foreign defendant must have minimum contacts with the U.S. forum in order to
be subjected to the personal jurisdiction of a U.S. court. International Shoe Co. v. State of
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The U.S. Supreme Court in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 113-16 (1987), specified the fairness factors a
court must consider in determining whether the foreign defendant has sufficient minimum
contacts with the forum to be subject to personal jurisdiction: 1) the burden on the defendant;
2) the interests of the forum state; and 3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief. Id. A
court must also consider: 4) the interstate and international judicial system's interest in obtaining
the most efficient resolution of the controversies; id. at 1034-35; and 5) the procedural and
substantive policies of other nations whose interest will be affected. Id.
In Asahi, the issue was whether the mere awareness on the part of a foreign manufacturer
that its components reached California in the stream of commerce constituted sufficient
minimum contacts with the forum state for personal jurisdiction. Id. at 1029. After considering
the international context, the heavy burden on the foreign defendant in requiring him to defend
himself in a suit in California, and the slight interests of the plaintiff and California in
resolving this controversy, "the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a California court over
[the foreign defendant] . . . would be unreasonable and unfair." Id. at 1035.
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Even where the foreign defendant is subject to in personam juris-
diction of a United States forum, the court must still go through a
three-step process to determine whether service of process is legally
effective. First, under the Due Process Clause, 20 would it be fair to
subject the foreign defendant to the service rules of the plaintiff's
forum?21 Second, does the service method comport with international
law under the Hague Service Convention?2 Third, was the method
reasonably calculated to give the defendant actual notice of the
pending suit in time to defend as required by the Due Process Clause
of the United States Constitution? 2
Under the Due Process Clause, every instance of service of process
must be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to give
actual notice to the defendant of the pending suit in time to defend.24
Importantly, the notice must inform the defendant of the charges
against him and must indicate what he can do to avoid a default
judgment. 2 Since the plaintiff is unlikely to travel abroad to perfect
20. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that: "No person
shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"[NIor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; ..... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. There are two aspects to due process: procedural,
which guarantees a person fair procedures; and substantive, which protects a person's property
from unfair interference or taking by the government. BLAcK's LAW DICIONARY 448 (5th ed.
1979).
21. The court in Crose v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft stated that it was a matter
of fairness to the parties whether the foreign defendant should be subjected to domestic service
of process. 88 Wash. 2d 50, 558 P.2d 764, 768 (1977).
22. Hague Service Convention, supra note 3.
23. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). "An elementary
and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality
is notice reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Id. at
314.
24. Under United States law, service of process refers to a formal delivery of the complaint
and summons which are sufficiently informative to charge the defendant with legal notice of
the pending suit and which are given in "sufficient time" to allow the defendant an opportunity
to defend and be heard. Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946). The Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution has been interpreted to guarantee to all
domestic and foreign defendants either personal service of process, which invariably gives
actual notice of the pending suit, or substituted service of process, which must be reasonably
calculated to give actual notice. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schiunk, 108 S. Ct.
2104 (1988); Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
25. For service on a foreign defendant, special problems arise if the defendant does not
conduct business in or understand English. Serving process on a defendant who the plaintiff
knows does not comprehend English is similar to the situation in Covey v. Somers, 351 U.S.
141 (1956). The plaintiff served process on a person known by the plaintiff to be incompetent
and unable to understand the summons and complaint. Since the defendant could not
comprehend the written word, she defaulted. The United States Supreme Court set aside the
default judgment, holding that the circumstances of the individual recipient of service must
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personal service on the foreign defendant, this Comment discusses
two practical alternatives for substituted service: service through the
mail and service upon a domestic affiliate. This Comment investigates
the problems the plaintiff will face in serving each of the five types
of foreign defendants while maintaining consistency with United
States law and the Hague Service Convention.
II. FAIRNESS OF SUBJECTING A FOREIGN DEFENDANT TO UNITED
STATES SERVICE OF PROCESS STATUTES
As indicated by the Washington State Supreme Court in Crose v.
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft,26 whether the foreign defendant
should be subject to domestic service or whether the plaintiff must
resort to international service abroad is a question of "fairness to
the parties." This fairness determination is based on procedural Due
Process requirements of the United States Constitution, which guar-
antee that any court procedure determining the defendant's rights be
fair.27
The Crose court specified the following factors (hereinafter the
Crose factors) to be considered in determining whether it is fair to
subject a foreign defendant to domestic service of process: 1) the
interest of the forum in providing a place for its residents to resolve
legal disputes;2 2) the ease with which the plaintiff could gain access
to another forum;29 3) the amount, kind, and continuity of the
be taken into account. Id. at 145-48. Similarly, if the plaintiff knows that the foreign defendant
does not comprehend English, then she should not be allowed to serve a summons and
complaint written only in English. See Adams, "Citado A Comparecer':" Language Barriers
and Due Process-Is Mailed Notice in English Constitutionally Sufficient?, 61 CAIr. L. REv.
1395 (1973) [hereinafter Adams]. A possible alternative is to serve a translated summary of
the summons or to translate the whole summons.
26. 88 Wash. 2d 50, 558 P.2d 764 (1977).
27. Procedural due process guarantees that persons whose rights are to be affected are
entitled to reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard to present any claim or defense.
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313-15.
28. Crose, 558 P.2d at 768. See also McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220
(1957) (it is sufficient for purposes of due process that a suit against an out-of-state mail
order firm was based on a contract which had a substantial connection with the state. "Since
the contract was delivered in the state, the premiums were mailed there and the insured was
a resident when he died, the state had a manifest interest in providing effective means of
redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims.") Id. at 223-24.
29. Crose, 558 P.2d at 768. See also Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643
(1952). Where the nonresident defendant's business activities reach beyond the border of one
state and create continuing relationships and obligations with residents of another state, the
state has a legitimate interest in protecting its residents against risks from outside the state
and may subject the nonresident defendant to personal jurisdiction. Where the amount in
dispute is small so that the plaintiff would not be likely to travel far to pursue it, the suits
on alleged losses can be more conveniently tried in the plaintiff's forum since witnesses live
there and the claims could be investigated, the "Due Process Clause does not forbid a state
to protect its citizens from such injustice." Id. at 647-49.
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activities carried on by the foreign defendant in the forum; 0 4) the
significance of the economic benefits the foreign defendant derives
from the activities purposefully conducted within the forum;31 and
5) the foreseeability of injury as a result of using the foreign
defendant's products in the forum. 32 Finally, before reaching a con-
clusion, the court must weigh these Crose factors against two inter-
national interests: the foreign defendant's right to the procedural
protections of the Hague Service Convention and the destination
country's sovereignty, which may be infringed on by giving extrater-
ritorial legal effect to a United States service statute. 33
Generally, systematic and continuous activities which result from
maintaining a distribution network or owning subsidiaries in the
forum are sufficient to subject the Type (C), (D), and (E) defendants
to in personam jurisdiction as well as to service of process under
domestic statutes. However, for Type (A) and (B) defendants, United
States courts should longer assume that the power to exert personal
jurisdiction automatically brings with it the power to subject the
foreign defendant to domestic service statutes.
To understand why the court must decide whether the foreign
defendant can be fairly subjected to United States service statutes,
consider applying the Crose factors to the circumstances of the Type
(A) defendant who has no minimum contacts with the United States.
30. Crose, 558 P.2d at 768. See also Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S.
447-49 (1952). In Perkins, a Phillippine mining company had its main operations and properties
in the Phillippines; during World War II it ceased operations in the Phillippines, but its
president maintained an office, carried on correspondence, paid salaries, and kept substantial
bank accounts in Ohio. Because of these continuous and systematic activities inside Ohio,
Ohio courts could exert personal jurisdiction over the Phllippine company for causes of action
relating to activities entirely unrelated to its conduct in Ohio.
31. Crose, 558 P.2d at 768. See also Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (mini-
mum contacts must have, as a basis for personal jurisdiction, some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails himself of the benefits of the forum).
32. Crose, 558 P.2d at 768 (citations omitted). See also Worldwide Volkswagen v. Wood-
son, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (due process not violated when forum state exerts personal
jurisdiction over foreign corporation which served market with products that caused foreseeable
injury).
33. Article 13 of the Hague Service Convention provides:
Where a request for service complies with the terms of the present Convention, the
State addressed may refuse to comply therewith only if it deems that compliance
would infringe its sovereignty or security.
It may not refuse to comply soley on the ground that, under its internal law, it
claims exclusive jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action or that its internal
law would not permit the action upon which the application is based.
The Central Authority shall, in case of refusal, promptly inform the applicant
and state the reasons for the refusal.
Hague Service Convention, supra note 3, at art. 13; 20 U.S.T. at 364.
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In Lemme v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc. 3 Konishi, a Japanese
corporation, guaranteed the contractual performance of Wine of
Japan, a New York corporation. 35 Konishi was not "doing business"
or "transacting business" in New York. 36 There was no agency
relationship between Konishi and Wine of Japan which would subject
Konishi to the in personam jurisdiction of New York courts, 37 as
Wine of Japan did not act for the primary benefit of Konishi, 31 and
Konishi, owning only 27% of Wine of Japan, did not exert any
control over Wine of Japan. 9 There was no in personam jurisdiction
based on Konishi performing a contract in New York, as a guarantee
of a contract to be performed in Japan is not a contract to be
performed in New York.40
Personal jurisdiction was proper only because Konishi, in guar-
anteeing the performance of Wine of Japan, had accepted the con-
tract's consent-to-jurisdiction clause. 41 Consequently, the Lemme court
held that Konishi had also consented to the jurisdiction of the New
York courts.42 Then, without first determining whether it was fair to
subject Konishi to New York's postal service statute, the Lemme
court immediately analyzed the sufficiency of postal service on Kon-
ishi in Japan.43
Although the contractual guarantee involving the performance of
a New York corporation may allow the New York courts to exert in
34. 631 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
35. Id. at 458. "Konishi, a major shareholder of Wine of Japan, lent its credit to the
deal by guaranteeing 'the performance of each and every term and condition of [the Agreement]
as if said obligations, representations and warranties were of and made by it, or the conditions
and terms of said Agreement were to be performed . . .' " by Konishi. Id. Konishi signed the
contract guarantee in Japan. Id. The contract was to be performed by Wine of Japan (a New
York corporation) in Japan, as all sales were f.o.b. Japan. Id.
36. Id. at 459. "Konishi is a Japanese corporation with its principal place of business in
Japan. It is not licensed to do business in New York. Konishi maintains no offices, employees
or bank accounts in New York, owns no property [in New York], and never solicits business
or advertises its products [in New York]." Id. at 458.
37. Id. at 459-60. "In sum, plaintiff has shown only that Wine of Japan sold products
originally distributed by Konishi in Japan, that Konishi knew of the Agreement between Wine
of Japan and plaintiff, and that Konishi guaranteed it. This is simply not enough to establish
agency." Id. at 460.
38. Id.
39. Lemme, 631 F. Supp. at 460 ("Nothing in plaintiff's allegations demonstrates that
Konishi exercised any control over Wine of Japan.") Id.
40. Id. at 459. "Because Wine of Japan was to perform its contract in Japan, no personal
jurisdiction exists over Konishi on the basis of the 'contracts anywhere' clause of" New York's
personal jurisdiction statute. Id.
41. Id. at 461. "In these circumstances Konishi could 'reasonably anticipate being hauled
into court [in New York]' . . . and it would be unfair to allow it now to evade jurisdiction
there." Id. (citing Worldwide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
42. Id. at 460-61.
43. Id. at 462-64.
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personam jurisdiction over the Japanese guarantor, 44 that guarantee
may not, under a Crose analysis, justify subjecting Konishi to federal
or state service of process statutes. Failure to first determine the
fairness of subjecting Konishi to service of process under internal
U.S. statutes deprived the Japanese defendant of the procedural
protections it was entitled to under both the U.S. Constitution and
the Hague Service Convention.
The Crose factors weigh against subjecting the Lemme Type (A)
defendant to United States service statutes, because the defendant
does not operate continuously in the United States. The Japanese
defendant, Konishi, merely guaranteed the contractual performance
of Wine of Japan, a New York corporation45 (actual performance of
the contract would have occurred in Japan).46 Konishi did not pur-
posefully avail itself of economic benefits from New York as opposed
to a distributor (a Type (C) defendant) who consciously serves foreign
markets. While service through the Central Authority of Japan would
take longer and be slightly more expensive, the interest of New York
in providing a forum for its residents, and the plaintiff's ability to
"haul" 47 the defendant into a New York court, would not have been
seriously impaired by requiring service through Japan's Central Au-
thority.
The Type (B) defendant, who operates only occasionally in the
United States and who may be sued on causes of action related to
its purposeful activities within the forum under specific jurisdiction,"
presents another close case. Even though the defendant is subject to
specific jurisdiction, it may well be unfair to subject this same
defendant to service of process under a United States service statute.
At first glance, a defendant with sufficient minimum contacts for
specific jurisdiction may appear to be automatically subject to the
forum's service statutes. However, the Due Process analysis for
personal jurisdiction and for service of process is separate and
distinct. 49 Substantive due process 0 for personal jurisdiction prevents
44. Lemme, 631 F. Supp. at 460-61.
45. Id. at 458.
46. Id. at 459.
47. Worldwide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
48. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1985); Smith v. Dainichi
Kinzoku Kogyo Co., 680 F. Supp. 847, 852 (W.D. Tex. 1988).
49. Geick v. American Honda Motor Co., 117 F.R.D. 123, 128 (C.D. I11. 1987) ("This
court adheres to the belief that minimum contacts [for personal jurisdiction] and service of
process are two distinct concepts, which require the application of differing standards when
determining whether each has been met.") Id. Although the Geick court was discussing the
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a state from making a binding judgment against a defendant "with
which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations."' 51 Procedural Due
Process52 for service of process requires that any form of service be
reasonably calculated to give the defendant actual notice of the
pending suit in time to defend.5 3 Courts cannot ignore the distinction 54
as the results of the two distinct due process analyses are not
necessarily coextensive. 55
sufficiency of service of process, the same distinction applies when determining under the
Crose factors whether the foreign defendant should be subjected to domestic service of process.
See Crose v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 88 Wash. 2d 50, 558 P.2d 764, 768 (1977).
50. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that "No person shall be
... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CoNsT.
amend. V. Whether subjecting a foreign defendant comports with Fifth Amendment substantive
due process depends on "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International
Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citations omitted).
51. Schaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977) (citing International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). Due Process "requires only that in order to subject
a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum,
he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" International Shoe, 326 U.S.
at 316 (citations omitted). For the factors used by the U.S. court to determine whether it
would be fair to subject the foreign defendant to personal jurisdiction, see supra note 19
discussing Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 113-116
(1987).
52. Under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, a foreign national is entitled
to either: 1) personal service, which typically requires service abroad and triggers the procedural
requirements of the Hague Service Convention; or 2) substituted service that provides notice
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to give actual notice to the defendant in
time for him to present his objections. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 108 S.
Ct. 2104, 2111 (1988).
53. Mullane Y. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
54. See Geick v. American Honda Motor Co., 117 F.R.D. 123, 128 (C.D. Ill. 1987),
where the federal court was discussing the two prerequisites to an Illinois court's exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a defendant: 1) the defendant must have sufficient activity within
Illinois to have submitted to jurisdiction; and 2) the defendant must have been served according
to the formal, statutory requirements of Illinois law. Id. The Geick court, a federal court
applying Illinois state law, stated: "Although the Schlunk court made note of this distinction,
it then seemingly disregarded it in its analysis." Id. at 128. The Geick court stated that it
would have applied a different analysis than the Illinois state court did in Schlunk v.
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 745 Ili. App. 3d 594, 495 N.E.2d 1114, 1118, 99 111. Dec.
379 (1986). Geick, 117 F.R.D. at 127-28.
55. Although the due process fairness determination for exerting in personam jurisdiction
is based on several of the same factors used to determine the fairness of subjecting the
defendant to domestic service of process, the final weighing of the Crose factors for domestic
service of process may not lead to the same result as for personal jurisdiction. In another
context, a defendant in an antitrust suit could be found immune to service of process in a
district even though the same district had in personam jurisdiction and proper venue:
Although difference of that sort may appear to be generally incongruous, since
ordinarily it would seem that susceptibility to suit in a district should be accompanied
by amenability to process there, such things are of course for Congress' determination
as matters of policy relating to the scope and correlation, or lack of it, of venue
and service provisions. There is certainly no constitutional requirement that the two
be coextensive.
United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795, 810 n.21 (1948).
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Given that there are two systems available for service of process,
one domestic and the other international, the Crose factors compel
the judge to consciously decide whether it would be unfair, under
the circumstances, to subject the Type 03) defendant who has derived
benefits from a single sale in the forum, to service of process under
a United States statute. Arguably, the plaintiff could as easily serve
process under the Central Authority as under a domestic postal
service statute. Even though the single order may meet the minimum
contact threshold for exerting specific jurisdiction over the defendant,
the single order may not meet the requirements under Crose for
subjecting the defendant to domestic service of process. If most of
the orders were initiated by United States customers, or if the
defendant is far back in the distribution chain, the defendant's level
of purposefully seeking economic benefits from the forum may not
justify taking away the procedural protections it is entitled to under
the Hague Service Convention, leaving it with only the due process
protections under the United States Constitution. The sporadic nature
of the Type (B) defendant's operations in the United States may
make it unforeseeable to the defendant that it could be "haled" into
court under a United States service statute.
Obligations under international law require that United States
courts be vigilant in protecting the procedural rights that foreign
defendants have under the Hague Service Convention, just as U.S.
courts must protect the rights of foreign defendants guaranteed by
the United States Constitution.-6
III. THE HAGUE SERVICE CONVENTION
A. The Central Authority
If under the Crose analysis the defendants may not be fairly
subjected to the service of process statutes of the forum, the plaintiff
may serve process through the Central Authority of the defendant's
country as provided by the Hague Service Convention.5 7 Prior to the
56. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2111 (1988) (foreign defendants are assured of the protections
of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution).
57. Article 2 of the Hague Service Convention provides:
Each contracting State shall designate a Central Authority which will undertake to
receive requests for service coming from other contracting States and to proceed in
conformity with the provisions of articles 3 to 6.
Each State shall organize the Central Authority in conformity with its own law.
Hague Service Convention, supra note 3, at art. 2; 20 U.S.T. at 362.
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Convention, default judgments were common because there was no
efficient or mutually compatible system for serving process abroad.5"
Many of the problems with international service stemmed from
differences in judicial practice between civil and common law coun-
tries. The multi-state federal system of the United States was partic-
ularly troublesome. 59 Consequently, in 1965, several nations adopted
the Hague Service Convention, a multilateral international treaty
designed to overcome many of the obstacles to international service
of process. 60 The Convention provides for service of judicial and
extrajudicial documents between signatory countries. 61
The purpose of the Convention, as stated in the Preamble, is to
ensure that foreign defendants receive notice of pending suits in
"sufficient time" 62 to defend, thereby resembling the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution. 6 According to Article 1,
the Convention applies in all cases "where there is occasion to
transmit ... service abroad." 64 Under Article 2, the Convention
creates the primary channel for service abroad by establishing a
Central Authority in each signatory country. 65 The Convention allows
58. Magnarini, Service of Process Abroad Under the Hague Convention, 71 MARQ. L.
REv. 649, 653-54 (1988) [hereinafter Magnarini].
59. DeJames v. Magnificience, 654 F.2d 280, 288 (3d Cir. 1981).
60. Magnarini, supra note 58, at 652.
61. Hague Service Convention, supra note 3; 20 U.S.T. at 361.
62. The Preamble to the Hague Service Convention states:
Desiring to create appropriate means to ensure that judicial and extrajudicial docu-
ments to be served abroad shall be brought to the notice of the addressee in sufficient
time,
Desiring to improve the organization of mutual judicial assistance for that purpose
by simplifying and expediting the procedure,
Have resolved to conclude a Convention to this effect ....
Hague Service Convention, supra note 3, at Preamble; 20 U.S.T. at 362.
63. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution and Articles 15 and 16 of the Hague Service Convention have been held to provide
equivalent assurances of actual notice and protections against default judgments for foreign
defendants. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104, 2116 (1988)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (equating "in due time" as the Hague Service Convention requires
with "due process of law" as the United States Constitution requires); Shoei Kako Co., Ltd.
v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1973) (holding that Article 15
of the Convention is the equivalent of our national due process concept, and it was so
recognized in the Senate). Article 15 of the Hague Service Convention provides that the service
of process documents are to be delivered in "sufficient time to enable the defendant to
defend," while Article 16 protects foreign defendants from default judgments entered in foreign
courts. Hague Service Convention, supra note 3, at arts. 15-16; 20 U.S.T. at 364-65.
64. Article I of the Hague Service Convention provides: "The present Convention shall
apply in all cases, in civil or commercial matters, where there is occasion to transmit a judicial
or extrajudicial document for service abroad." Hague Service Convention, supra note 3, at
art. 1; 20 U.S.T. at 362.
65. Id. at arts. 2, 20; 20 U.S.T. at 362, 365.
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for other forms of service, arguably including postal service, under
Article 10(a). 6 Signatory countries may object to certain forms of
transmission, especially postal service, 67 but no signatory country may
object to service under the Central Authority."
The most significant innovation of the Convention is the creation
of Central Authorities who are empowered to receive service docu-
ments from abroad.69 The Central Authority may require translation
of some or all the service documents. 70 Once the Central Authority
receives a proper request for service, it must serve the documents
either by a method prescribed by the internal laws of the receiving
country or by a method requested by the plaintiff, as long as that
method does not conflict with the internal laws of the receiving
country.71 The Central Authority may decline a request for service
that does not conform to the terms of the Convention under Article
4,72 or if the request infringes upon the destination country's sover-
eignty under Article 13. 73 The Convention restricts the authority of
the Central Authority to object to a service request, to technical
compliance with the terms of the Convention.74
The Hague Service Convention does not affect the internal laws
of signatory countries regarding the receipt of service of process
66. See infra notes 89-117 and accompanying text.
67. Hague Service Convention, supra note 3, arts. 8, 10; 20 U.S.T. at 363.
68. Id. at art. 2; 20 U.S.T. at 362.
69. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104, 2107 (1988).
70. Article 5 of the Hague Service Convention provides:
The Central Authority of the State addressed shall itself serve the document or shall
arrange to have it served by an appropriate agency, either -
(a) by a method prescribed by its internal law for the service of documents in
domestic actions upon persons who are within its territory, or
(b) by a particular method requested by the applicant, unless such a method is
incompatible with the law of the state addressed.
Subject to sub-paragraph (b) of the first paragraph of this article, the document
may always be served by delivery to an addressee who accepts it voluntarily.
If the document is to be served under the first paragraph above, the Central
Authority may require the document to be written in, or translated into, the official
language or one of the official languages of the State addressed.
That part of the request, in the form attached to the present Convention, which
contains a summary of the document to be served, shall be served with the document.
Hague Service Convention, supra note 3, at art. 5; 20 U.S.T at 362-63.
71. Id.
72. Id. at art. 4; 20 U.S.T. at 362. Article 4 provides: "If the Central Authority considers
that the request does not comply with the provisions of the present Convention it shall
promptly inform the applicant and specify its objections." Id.
73. Id. at art. 13; 20 U.S.T. at 364.
74. Id.
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 2
from abroad. 75 However, the Convention does limit or control the
plaintiff's use of her forum's domestic statutes which authorize
transmitting service of process abroad. 76 One problem that frequently
occurs is that a statute of the originating country may authorize a
method of serving process which is not allowed in the receiving
country. 77 For example, while substituted service78 both through the
mai 9 and on agents80 is authorized under United States laws, the
internal laws of some destination countries do not authorize either
method.81
IV. INTERNATIONAL SERVICE OF PROCESS SENT THROUGH THE
MAn: DOES IT COMPORT WITH THE HAGUE SERVICE CONVENTION
AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE?
The Hague Service Convention controls the sending of judicial
documents abroad through the mail under Article 10(a), which de-
clares that the Convention does not "interfere ... with the freedom
to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons
abroad." 82 Controversy over Article 10(a) revolves around whether
75. Article 19 of the Hague Service Convention provides: "To the extent that the internal
law of a contracting State permits methods of transmission, other than those provided for in
the preceding articles, of documents coming from abroad, for service within it territory, the
present Convention shall not affect such provisions." Hague Service Convention, supra note
3, at art. 19; 20 U.S.T. at 365.
76. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104, 2111 (1988); Service
of Process Abroad, supra note 14, at 71 (service of process in contravention of the Convention
is invalid).
77. Service of Process Abroad, supra note 14, at 71. "[I]s service that is neither prohibited
nor expressly permitted by the Convention or by the law of the foreign nation permissible-
that is, does the Convention set forth the only permissible methods of extraterritorial service
in countries that are parties to the Convention?" Id.
78. Substituted service is any method of service other than personal service. The United
States Constitution requires that any form of substituted service of process be that method,
other than personal service, most likely to give actual notice of the suit to the defendant. "To
dispense with personal service the substitute that is most likely to reach the defendant is the
least that ought to be required if substantial justice is to be done." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 218 n.* (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Donald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92
(1917)).
79. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i).
80. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
81. Moreover, if the plaintiff wants to enforce a personal judgment obtained in the United
States in a foreign court, the foreign court may require proper service on the defendant under
the Convention. See Hatiey, The Enforcement of Judgments and the Requirement of Proper
Service Under 27(2), 12 ErR. L. Rnv. 2207 (1987); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.
Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104, 2111 (1988) ("parties that comply with the Convention ultimately
may find it easier to enforce their judgments abroad").
82. Article 10 provides:
Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not
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the phrase "send judicial documents" refers to "service of process."
If the term "send" does mean "service," then, unless the signatory
country objects to Article 10(a), plaintiffs may use domestic postal
service statutes to serve foreign defendants in that country.83 How-
ever, if the phrase "send" does not refer to "service," then the
Convention does not expressly authorize plaintiffs to serve process
abroad through the mail.8 Many countries, including West Germany,
have objected to the postal provisions of Article 10(a). 85 Conse-
quently, the plaintiff cannot serve process through the mail on a
defendant located in West Germany. 86 Other countries, including
Japan, have not objected to Article 10(a),87 thereby implying that
plaintiffs may serve process into Japan through the mail. 88
A. Article 10(a) Authorizes Postal Service
A substantial number of United States federal and state courts
have interpreted the word "send" as referring to "service."8 9 The
interfere with
(a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons
abroad,
(b) the freedom of judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State
of origin to effect service of judicial documents directly through the judicial officers,
officials or other competent persons of the State of destination,
(c) the freedom of any person interested in a judicial proceeding to effect service of
judicial documents directly through the judicial officers, officials or other competent
persons of the states of destination.
Hague Service Convention, supra note 3, at art. 10; 20 U.S.T. at 363.
83. See infra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 100-08 and accdmpanying text.
85. Cintron v. W & D Machinery Co., 182 N.J. Super. 126, 440 A.2d 76, 81 (1981).
86. See Service of Process Abroad, supra note 14, at 80 n.99 and cases cited therein. If
a signatory country has objected to the service by mail under Article 10(a), then any attempted
service by mail is invalid. Id.
87. Suzuki Motor Co. v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1476, 1480, 249 Cal. Rptr.
376 (1988).
88. See Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 821, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402
(1973) (Article 10(a) refers to sending of documents abroad for the purpose of service). In
any case, when sending service documents through the mail to a signatory country, there is
no need to translate the service documents unlike the translation requirements where service
is made through the Central Authority. Lemme v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc., 631 F. Supp.
456, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Weight v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd., 597 F. Supp. 1082,
1085-86 (E.D. Va. 1984).
89. Meyers v. ASICS Corp., 711 F. Supp. 1001 (C.D. Cal. 1989); Smith v. Dainichi
Kinzoku Kogyo Co., Ltd., 680 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. Tex. 1988) (service of process directly
upon Japanese defendant in Japan by registered mail was sufficient according to Article 10);
Newport Components v. NEC Home Electronics, 671 F. Supp. 1525, 1541 (C.D. Cal. 1987);
Sandoval v. Honda Motor Corp., Ltd., 364 Pa. Super. 136, 527 A.2d 564, 566 (1987);
Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 830-40 (2d Cir. 1986); Lemme v. Wine of Japan Import,
Inc., 631 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Weight v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd., 597 F.
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California First District Appellate Court, in Shoei Kako v. Superior
Court,90 looked at the Convention as a whole and concluded that
the distinction between "send" and "service" is not appropriate
given the overall purpose of the Convention to facilitate international
service. 9' Since Japan had not objected to Article 10(a) when it
adopted the Convention, 92 the Shoei Kako court concluded that Japan
intended to allow service coming from abroad to be sent through
the mail.93 Moreover, interpreting the term "send" as referring to
"service" fulfills an important cannon of statutory interpretation,
that of giving statutes a positive legal purpose. If Article 10(a) is to
fulfill a positive legal purpose, the Convention's drafters must have
meant "service" when they used the term "send." 94 Were "send"
simply to mean sending documents without legal effect, Article 10(a)
would have the nebulous legal effect of merely authorizing the
transmittal of documents abroad, which was possible before the
Convention. 95
In another approach, a New York federal district court, in Lemme
v. Wine Import of Japan,96 decided that interpreting "send" to refer
Supp. 1082, 1085-86 (E.D. Va. 1984); Zisman v. Sieger, 106 F.R.D. 194 (N.D. I11. 1985);
Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1182, 1206 (D.D.C. 1984); DeJames
v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc. 654 F.2d 280, 288 (3d Cir. 1981); Shoei Kako Co., Ltd. v.
Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1973) (service of process from
United States by registered mail on Japanese corporation in Japan having sufficient minimum
contacts with California to uphold personal jurisdiction held to comply with Hague Service
Convention).
90. 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1973).
91. Id. at 821. The court stated: "Although there is some merit to the proposed distinction
[between "send" and "service"] it is outweighed by consideration of the entire scope of the
convention." Id.
92. Suzuki Motor Co. v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1469, 1479, 249 Cal. Rptr.
376 (1988).
93. Several courts have followed the Shoei Kako reasoning. In Newport Components, a
federal district court sitting in California followed the Shoei Kako decision after looking at
the entire context of Article 10. Newport Components, 671 F. Supp. at 1541 (citing Shoe
Kako, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 822; Ackermann, 788 F.2d at 839.40; and Lemme 631 F. Supp. at
463). In Newport Components, the plaintiff had used the California postal service statute to
send service to Japan by first class mail. The court noted that the three subdivisions of Article
10 are exclusively devoted to setting out alternative provisions for service of process. Newport
Components, 671 F. Supp. at 1542. Since subdivisions (b) and (c) refer to "service" when
authorizing both personal service and service through consular and diplomatic channels, it is
fair to assume that subdivision 10(a) also refers to postal service when it uses the phrase "send
judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad, . . ." Id. In Ackermann,
the court looked to the frequent use of the term "service" throughout the Conyention, and
concluded that the ambiguity of the phrase send was due to "careless drafting." Ackermann,
788 F.2d at 839.
94. Shoei Kako, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 821; Lemme, 631 F. Supp. at 463.
95. Sandoval v. Honda Motor Co., 364 Pa. Super. 136, 527 A.2d 564, 566 (1987),
reasoned that "[p]ersons do not need an international convention on the service of judicial
documents to give them the right to 'send' mail." Id.
96. Lemme, 631 F. Supp. at 464.
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to "service" actually protects the sovereignty of the destination
country since mail service is the least intrusive of all methods au-
thorized in Article 10.9 The Lemme court reasoned that Japan, by
expressly objecting only to subdivisions 10(b) and 10(c), which pro-
vide for service personally and through judicial officers, was "pro-
moting the use of the least intrusive means of notifying its citizens
of lawsuits filed against them" in foreign countries. 98 Since service
through the mail under Article 10(a) intrudes less upon the destination
country's sovereignty than does personal service by a foreigner or by
foreign officials, the Lemme court reasoned that Japan was giving
maximum protection from foreign law to Japanese nationals. 99
B. Article 10(a) Does Not Authorize Postal Service Abroad
While many United States courts follow Shoei Kako, there is
substantial authority which holds that "send" in Article 10(a) does
not mean "service."' 100 In Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court
of San Bernardino County,10 the California Fourth District Appellate
Court noted that "the record before us indicates that Japan does
not have an internal legal system which allows service of process by
registered mail."lea Consequently, the Suzuki Motor court concluded
97. Id.
98. Id. The court stated that "Japan may have rejected sections 10(b) and 10(c) because
it is more concerned with who is arriving on the doorstep of its citizens to serve process than
with how that process is served." Id. See also Newport Components v. NEC Home Electronics,
671 F. Supp. 1525, 1542 (C.D. Cal. 1987). The Hague Service Convention "need not be
utilized first in every case" and direct mail service is allowed unless such service intrudes upon
Japanese sovereignty. Id.
99. Lemme, 631 F. Supp. at 464. The court noted that if "Japan's interest is in promoting
the use of the least intrusive means of notifying its citizens of lawsuits filed against them, it
would be logical to permit [service only through] the Central Authority .... " Id.
100. Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 123 F.R.D. 595 (W.D. Ark. 1989); Suzuki Motor
Co. v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1476, 249 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1988); Reynolds v. Koh,
109 A.D.2d 97, 490 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1985); Ormandy v. Lynn, 122 Misc. 2d 954, 472 N.Y.S.2d
274 (1984); Hantover, Inc. v. Omet, S.N.C. of Volentieri & Co., 688 F. Supp. 1377 (V.D.
Mo. 1988) (service into Italy; the Hague Service Convention's repeated references to "service"
of documents implies that when drafters use "send," they did not intend to allow postal
service of process); Popchop v. Toyota Motor Co., 111 F.R.D. 464, 466 (S.D. Miss. 1986)
(service of process by direct mail not permitted under Convention); Mommsen v. Toro Co.,
108 F.R.D. 444, 446 (S.D. Iowa 1985) (Article 10(a) does not "expressly allow" service of
judicial process by postal channels in signatory nations; it merely permits one to "send"
judicial documents by mail to persons abroad).
101. Suzuki Motor Co. v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1476, 249 Cal. Rptr. 376
(1988). The Suzuki Motor court did not consider itself bound by the holding in Shoei Kako,
since appellate decisions among different California districts are not binding on one another.
Id. at 1478-79.
102. Id. at 1480. The Suzuki Motor court explained that "[i]n his declaration [for the
Japanese defendant], Mr. Asakura expounded on the acceptable methods of service of process
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that Japan was unlikely to have interpreted or understood Article
10(a) to refer to service of process. 103 Other courts have looked to
the drafters' original intent as evidenced in both the Convention's
provisions and the ordinary meaning of the words used.104 For
example, since "service" appears in over fifteen other places in the
Convention,0 5 using the term "send" must not mean "service." The
New York Supreme Court, in Reynolds v. Koh,1°6 felt that allowing
postal service would improperly relegate the Central Authority of the
destination country to an insignificant role. 10 Allowing postal service
of process would circumvent the Central Authority and would negate
the fundamental intent of the drafters to establish more formal modes
of service of process.Ice
C. Critical Analysis
The absence of internal laws expressly authorizing postal service
should not be determinative of the obligations a signatory country
in Japan and concluded that plaintiff here had failed to conform to these methods, and thereby
had also failed to conform to the requirements of the Hague Convention for service of process
in the Convention's signatory states." Id. at 1478. The plaintiff did not contest this declaration
but instead relied upon Shoei Kako. See also Peterson, Jurisdiction and the Japanese Defendant,
25 SANTA CLARA L. Ray. 555, 576-79 (1985) (unlike California, Japan does not allow either
attorneys or lay people to serve process by mail); Reynolds v. Koh, 109 A.D.2d 97, 490
N.Y.S.2d 295, 298 (1985) ("the law of Japan is apparently incompatible with the law of New
York, which provides for direct service by one litigant upon another, because under Japanese
law service of process is the court's responsibility.") Id. (citations omitted).
103. Suzuki Motor, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1482. "However, whether the phrase 'to send'
was used because of careless drafting or not, it appears that Japan understood it to mean 'to
send,' not 'to serve,' as it is implausible that a country which does not use basic postal
channels for service of process by its own nationals on their fellows, and which objected to
the more rigorous methods of service set out in Article 10, subsidivisions (b) and (c), would
have failed to object to subdivision (a) if it had understood that section to relate to service
of process." Id.
104. Maximov v. United States, 299 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1962), aff'd, 373 U.S. 49 (1963).
105. Hague Service Convention, supra note 3, mentions "service" in the following articles:
art. 1, "service abroad"; art. 2, "requests for service"; art. 3, "document to be served"; art.
5, "serve the document or shall arrange to have it served"; art. 6, "the document has been
served"; art. 8, "effect service of judicial documents"; art. 9, "forward documents, for the
purpose of service"; art. 10 (b) and (c), "effect service of judicial documents"; art. 11, "for
the purpose of service of judicial documents"; art. 12, "service of judicial documents"; art.
13, "request for service"; art. 14, "transmission of judicial documents for service"; art. 15
and art. 16, "transmitted abroad for the purpose of service"; art. 17, "purpose of service."
Id. (emphasis added).
106. Reynolds v. Koh, 109 A.D.2d 97, 490 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1985).
107. Id. at 298. The court noted that to allow service under Article 10(a) would "relegate
the role of the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs [as Japan's Central Authority] in a way
that seems contrary to the intent of the Hague [Service] Convention." Id.
108. Ormandy v. Lynn, 122 Misc. 2d 954, 472 N.Y.S.2d 274, 275 (1984). In this case there
was service on the Japanese defendant, Toyota Motor Corporation, by registered mail. This
court concluded that a liberal reading of "send" to include effective service of legal process
would vitiate the fundamental intent of the parties to establish more formal modes of service
such as through the Central Authority. Id.
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has assumed to recognize international postal service under the Hague
Service Convention. 109 It is not unusual for a country to incur
international obligations under a treaty and subsequently modify its
internal laws to comply with that treaty. Japan and other countries
which have not expressly objected to Article 10(a) could not have
been unaware of the opportunity to object to Article 10(a). Even
now, Japan could easily object to Article 10(a) if it did not wish its
nationals served from abroad by mail. The fact that countries such
as West Germany have expressly objected to Article 10(a) and dis-
allow postal service, and that other countries such as the United
States have expressly recognized postal service coming from abroad
under Article 10(a)," 0 strongly suggests that the countries signatory
to the Convention have understood "send" to mean "service of
process." Moreover, one of the remarkable achievements of modern
times has been the advances made in international communications.
The postal service remains one of the enduring pillars of global
communications. Given that there is no express statement to the
contrary, it seems odd that a convention devoted to facilitating
communication between the parties to a lawsuit should be interpreted
as not including service by post.
One objection to allowing postal service under Article 10(a) is that
service through the mail infringes on the sovereignty of the destination
country."' This infringement occurs when service of process by mail
is not authorized under the internal laws of the defendant's country
and when the United States gives legal effect to postal service into
that country. The effect is that any judgment pursuant to that service
109. In Cartwright v. Fokker Aircraft U.S.A., Inc., 713 F. Supp. 389 (N.D. Ga. 1988),
the court considered the validity of postal service by the Central Authority of the Netherlands,
a country which does not allow service of process by mail under its internal law. Id. at 395.
The Cartwright court did not consider the existence or nonexistence of an internal law
authorizing postal service of process to be a decisive factor in determining whether the postal
service from abroad was compatible with internal Netherlands law. However, in adopting the
Convention, the Netherlands indicated no objection to receiving postal service from abroad
through the mail. Id. The Netherlands defendant did not point to any provision in the internal
law of the Netherlands which would suggest that postal service violates one of that country's
"deep-rooted" national policies. Id. The Cartwright court determined that the absence of
provisions for postal service of process was an insufficient indication that postal service is
incompatible with Netherlands law. Id. at 395-96 (citing Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830,
838-40 (2d Cir. 1986)). The Cartwright court noted that the Central Authority of the Netherlands
used mail in complying with the service request, and concluded that postal service by the
Central Authority of the Netherlands was compatible with the internal law of the Netherlands,
even though the Netherlands lacked any other postal service statute. Cartwright, 713 F. Supp
at 396.
110. Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 838-40 (2d Cir. 1986).
111. Hague Service Convention, supra note 3, at art. 13; 20 U.S.T. at 363.
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would violate the prerogative of the destination country to prescribe
its own methods for regulating service of process. This is one of the
reasons West Germany has objected to Article 10(a)." 2 However,
there are several reasons for considering that postal service into a
country causes only a de minimis infringement on that country's
sovereignty.
Subdivisions (b) and (c) of Article 10"1 provide for methods such
as personal service and service through diplomatic channels, both of
which are much more intrusive than service by mail. 114 Foreign
governments would be more likely to prefer having a summons and
complaint issued from a foreign court come into its territory through
the relatively unintrusive means of post, rather then having a for-
eigner or diplomat execute service." 5 In today's world of crumbling
national borders brought on by instant world-wide communication
and greater economic, political and legal integration, the old argu-
ments of territorial integrity contain a hollow ring when voiced in
objection to a commonly used means of communication, i.e., inter-
national mail.
Recognition by the courts of the validity of international postal
service under Article 10(a) would only advance the Hague Service
Convention's objective of facilitating liberal methods of service of
process abroad." 6 In today's interconnected world, international lit-
igation may grind to a halt without postal service abroad." 7 The
enduring split of authority chills the use of international postal service
of process even in those jurisdictions which follow Shoei Kako and
interpret the term "send" as referring to "service." U.S. plaintiffs
are likely to be reluctant to serve by mail into Japan if there is any
doubt as to the validity of this method. Resolving the dilemma over
"send" in Article 10(a) depends on a definitive interpretation of
Article 10(a) by the United States Supreme Court. Meanwhile, con-
sistent with the objectives of the Convention, U.S. courts should
find that the Convention permits both postal service under Article
112. Ackermann, 788 F.2d at 838-40.
113. See supra note 82 for text of Articles 10(b) and 10(c).
114. Lemme v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 456, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
115. Id. at 464 n.9 (citations omitted).
116. Hague Service Convention, supra note 3, at Preamble; 20 U.S.T. at 362; see Service
of Process Abroad, supra note 14, at 82-84 (describing postal service abroad pursuant to Rule4(i)(l)(D).
117. If "send" does not mean "serve" then parties could not use mail to conduct
international litigation, a "prospect [that] would render foreign litigation in [signatory countries]
nigh impossible. . . ." Service of Process Abroad, supra note 14, at 80; Rich v. Kis California,
Inc., No. C-87-801 (M.D.N.C. April 25, 1988) (1988 WL 47605).
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10(a) and the use of the Central Authority under Article 2.
D. Postal Service of Process Must Be Reasonably Calculated to
Reach the Foreign Defendant and Give Actual Notice of the
Pending Suit
Accomplishing service through the post under Article 10(a) is not
the end of the plaintiff's task. The plaintiff must still show that the
postal service was both "reasonably calculated" to reach the defen-
dant in time to defend himself,118 and "informative" of the action
pending against the defendant.119 In the United States, postal service
of process by registered mail, requiring a signed receipt, is generally
considered reasonably calculated to reach the defendant, the standard
imposed by the Due Process Clause.120 However, some care must be
taken to make sure that postal service gives the defendant notice in
"sufficient time.''121
Once the defendant has received the service, the summons and
complaint must still give actual notice to the defendant of the legal
proceedings against him. 22 A serious problem may occur if the
defendant does not understand English.123 In considering whether
service of a summons and complaint written in English is sufficiently
"informative" 124 of the pending legal proceedings, the court must
look to the type of defendant and the surrounding circumstances.12
For example, due process may be violated if a court gave legal
validity to postal service on a Type (A) defendant, who does not
understand English and has no minimum contacts with the United
States. The Type (A) foreign defendant who is a small, localized
foreign manufacturer, may not conduct business operations in English
118. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
119. Julen v. Larson, 25 Cal. App. 3d 325, 328, 101 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1972) ("Notice to be
effective must be informative").
120. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313-14. If the mail service between the plaintiff's and defendant's
countries is irregular or undependable, the defendant may be able to successfully quash postal
service sent to him as not being reasonably calculated to give him actual notice. This Comment
assumes that the mail service between the United States and the signatory country of the
defendant is dependable.
121. Hague Service Convention, supra note 3, at Preamble; 20 U.S.T. at 362; Julen, 25
Cal. App. 3d at 327.
122. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15. See also Shoei Kako v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App.
3d 808, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1973).
123. Julen, 25 Cal. App. 3d at 328. United States courts protect American defendants
from service coming from foreign countries written in a foreign language, unless the U.S.
defendant understands the foreign language. Id.
124. Id.
125. Adams, supra note 25, at 1402.
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and may not be accustomed to receiving and translating communi-
cations in English. Even if it is fair under a Crose analysis to subject
the defendant to service under a U.S. statute, 26 the defendant may
object that the English-written summons and complaint fails to give
him actual notice of the legal proceedings. 127 A foreign defendant
who does not understand English may move to quash a summons
and complaint written in English, especially if the plaintiff knew of
the defendant's lack of capacity to understand English. 2 1 Under these
circumstances, it would be wise for the plaintiff to translate at least
the summons into the native language of the defendant. 29
The plaintiff's burden may be easier to meet when serving the
Type (B) defendant, who has unsystematic and uncontinuous activity
in the United States and is subject to specific jurisdiction. Take, for
example, a small foreign manufacturer who executes a single sale in
the United States. The manufacturer may conduct all of his business
in the German language. If the plaintiff negotiated the single sale in
German, and had no other basis for knowing that the defendant
spoke English, then at a minimum the plaintiff should be required
to translate the summons or provide a summary of the legal pro-
ceedings into German. 30 However, if the defendant sends out bro-
chures in English' or is known to be accustomed to receiving and
126. See supra notes 26-56.
127. See Lemme v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 456, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1986),
for a case where the court discussed this issue.
128. Adams, supra note 25, at 1403. See also Covey v. Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956) (the
Court considered the fact that the serving party knew the recipient was mentally incompetent,
so that even though the service statute was complied with, service was invalid because the
defendant could not understand the summons and complaint).
129. See Lemme, 631 F. Supp. at 464. The summons in this case was translated, so the
Japanese defendant, Konishi, had actual notice of the existence of the proceeding against it.
Id. See also Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) (if the form of service used "is
reasonably calculated to give [the defendant] actual notice of the proceedings [against him]
and an opportunity to be heard ... the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice
... implicit in due process are satisfied"). Id.
130. See Lemme, 631 F. Supp. at 464 (plaintiff translated the summons into Japanese,
served it through the mail into Japan, and the U.S. court held that the Japanese defendant
had "actual notice of the proceeding against it" because Japanese companies typically are
accustomed to receiving and translating communications in English). Id. A summary might
include, in the language of the jurisdiction where service takes place: the location of the
pending action, the amount involved, the date the defendant is required to respond, and the
consequences of not responding or defaulting. Julen v. Larson, 25 Cal. App. 3d 325, 328, 101
Cal. Rptr. 796 (1972).
131. Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 823-24, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402
(1973) (since the Japanese defendant authorized the use of brochures written in English to
further sales of its products, the court concluded that service of documents written in English
did not violate Due Process as the defendant probably understood them).
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translating English language communications, 132 then the defendant
has no grounds to challenge service of a summons and complaint
written in English. 133
In serving the Type (C) defendant, who is subject to general
jurisdiction through its systematic and continuous contacts with the
United States, the plaintiff should be able to meet her burden in
showing that a summons and complaint in English would inform 13 4
the Type (C) defendant of the pending legal proceedings against it.131
A typical Type (C) defendant would have conducted its U.S. business
activities in English.1 36 Generally, it would be rare for a foreign
defendant who controls a distribution network in the U.S. not to
conduct its business and receive communications in English. 137 Thus,
the plaintiff should easily meet her burden of showing that a sum-
mons and complaint written in English adequately informed the
defendant of the proceedings against it.
For Type (D) defendants, who operate through closely controlled,
wholly owned subsidiaries, and Type (E) defendants, who operate
through partially owned and controlled subsidiaries, the plaintiff may
have an easier time meeting its burden of showing that the defendant
understands English and knows the importance of the summons and
complaint. This is likely due to the level of integration of the
domestic, English oriented subsidiary into the business organization
of the parent. Justice Stevens has indicated that international invest-
ments may justify requiring the foreign investor to foresee being
subjected to domestic service of process in those countries where it
has invested.138 Accordingly, the Type (D) and (E) defendants could
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Juen, 25 Cal. App. 3d at 328.
135. See Shoei Kako, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 823, for an example.
136. A difficult case would be a foreign manufacturer whose domestic distributors conduct
business with the foreign defendant only in the defendant's native language. If the defendant
deals with its domestic affiliates only in German or Japanese, for example, the plaintiff's
burden may not be met.
137. The record in Shoe Kako stated that "all Japanese companies involved in trade with
other countries carry on correspondence with enterprises in such other countries relating to
such trade in the English language, and almost all Japanese companies involved in trade with
other countries are accustomed to receiving communications in English and have facilities for
the interpretation and translation of the same." Shoe Kako, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 823-24
(citations omitted). The same may be true of other multinational corporations operating in
international trade.
138. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens
stated that perhaps some activity, such as purchasing stock of a corporation organized under
the laws of a foreign nation, would subject the international investor to the jurisdiction of
that foreign sovereign. Id. To some limited extent one's property and affairs then become
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be required to carry the burden of translation of any summons and
complaint served upon them. 13 9
V. SERVICE OF PROCESS ON AFFILIATES OF FOREIGN DEFENDANTS
If the plaintiff is unable to serve the foreign defendant through
the mail for any of the reasons discussed above, the next potential
option to avoid serving overseas is to find a domestic affiliate that
may qualify as a representative of the foreign defendant.1 40 Any
service by a U.S. plaintiff on a domestic affiliate of a foreign
defendant potentially implicates the Hague Service Convention' 4' and
the Due Process Clause.' 42 In the following discussion, the question
of whether any of the five types of foreign defendants may be
compelled to appear after service upon its domestic affiliate will be
examined.
A. Agency
1. Ownership and Control and the Rule of Cannon
Domestic service might be possible if there is a domestic affiliate
that is considered to be an "agent for service of process" of the
foreign defendant. Various tests have been used by United States
subject to the laws of the nation of domicile of the corporation. Id. As a matter of international
law, requiring the foreign investor to become subject to the law of the nation of domicile of
the corporation is reasonably foreseeable. Id. This suggestion might be acceptable because
foreign investment is sufficiently unusual to make it appropriate to require the investor to
study the ramifications of his decision. Id.
139. Alternatively, the plaintiff may provide a translation in the native language of the
defendant of either the summons, as in Lemme, or of a summary containing the location of,
amount, and consequences of not responding to the legal proceeding. Julen v. Larson, 25 Cal.
App. 3d 325, 328, 101 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1972).
140. Crose v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 88 Wash. 2d 50, 558 P.2d 764, 768-69
("Service of process on an agent of a foreign corporation doing business within the state must
be on an agent representing the corporation with respect to such business"). Id. (citations
omitted). Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 444-45 (1952) ("Actual
notice of the proceeding was given to the [foreign] corporation ... through regular service of
summons upon its president while he was in [the state] acting in that capacity. Accordingly,
there can be no jurisdictional objection based upon a lack of notice to a responsible
representative of the corporation") Id. (emphasis added).
141. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104, 2107 (1988). The
Hague Service Convention requires that service reach the defendant in "sufficient time" to
defend. Hague Service Convention, supra note 3, at Preamble; 20 U.S.T. at 362.
142. The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution requires that substituted
service on an agent be reasonably calculated to give actual notice of the pending suit to the
defendant in time to be heard. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
314-15 (1950).
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courts to determine what constitutes an "agent for service of proc-
ess." 43 Generally, the purported "agent" must fill a "representative
capacity"''44 for the defendant in its business operations in the fo-
rum.145 The representative capacity is determined by considering
whether the affiliate is integrated into the manufacturing, marketing,
and sales operations of the defendant.146 Traditionally, these tests
have revolved around ownership and control. A typical set of factors
used to show control by the foreign defendant over the domestic
affiliate is the "doing business" analysis by the Illinois State Appel-
late Court in Schlunk v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft. 47
In Schlunk, the state appellate court focused on five factors in its
"doing business" analysis: 1) whether the affiliate existed predomi-
nantly to promote the sale and distribution of the defendant's goods;
2) whether the affiliate was contractually bound to sell the defendant's
goods; 3) whether the defendant dominated the board of directors
of the affiliate and held meetings in its own domicile; 4) whether
there was a detailed importer agreement, whereby the affiliate became
the sole distributor of the defendant's goods; and 5) whether the
defendant could terminate the importer agreement without notice to
the affiliate, if the affiliate experiences financial or business diffi-
culties. 148
One great impediment to the plaintiff serving process domestically
on an affiliate of the foreign multinational corporations is the Rule
143. "The term 'agent', as used in the jurisdictional sense, is broader than the meaning
given in the normal 'principal-agent' concept." Merkel Assoc., Inc. v. Bellofram Corp., 437
F. Supp. 612, 617 n.2 (W.D.N.Y. 1977). Similarly, the term "agent", as used in the context
of service of process, has a broader meaning than in the personal jurisdiction sense.
144. Crose, 558 P.2d at 769.
145. Exparte Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 443 So. 2d 881, 885 (Ala. 1983) (Torbert,
C.J., specially concurring) (quoting Crose, 558 P.2d at 769). "Establishing that the subsidiary
has 'such a responsible representative status in the relationship' to the parent makes it
reasonably certain that the subsidiary will turn over the process to the defendant parent." Id.
146. Crose, 558 P.2d at 769.
147. 745 11. App. 3d 594, 495 N.E.2d 1114 (1986). In this case, the domestic affiliate was
a wholly owned, closely controlled subsidiary and the foreign defendant was the parent
corporation. Id.
148. Id. The detailed importer agreement was of special significance to the Illinois state
court. In holding that the wholly owned subsidiary, Volkswagen of America, was an "agent
for service of process" for its parent, Volkswagen of Germany, the court considered the
following facts: 1) the parent made all the decisions regarding the method of ordering; 2) the
subsidiary had no claim against the parent arising from a rejection of orders; 3) the parent
corporation had no liability to the subsidiary for early, late, or non-deliveries; 4) the subsidiary
had to consult with the parent corporation before establishing dealerships and setting sales
goals; 5) the subsidiary was required to protect the parent's service and trademark by suing
in the parent's name; and 6) the subsidiary was required to keep the parent fully informed
about all aspects of its business. See discussion of "doing business" factors in Geick v.
American Honda Motor Co., 117 F.R.D. 123, 126-27 (C.D. Ill. 1987).
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of Cannon.149 Cannon held that mere ownership of a subsidiary,
without more, does not subject the foreign parent to the jurisdiction
of the state in which the subsidiary "does business."' 150 In the absence
of complete control and domination by the parent, Cannon precludes
considering the subsidiary from being an "agent" for personal juris-
diction or service of process.' 5 1 Consequently, unless the foreign
parent exerted a great deal of control over its domestic subsidiary in
the United States, the U.S. plaintiff could not serve the foreign
parent through substituted service on the U.S. subsidiary.5 2 The
application of Cannon to service of process, however, is unjustified. 5
What U.S. courts have frequently ignored is that there is a dis-
tinction between procedural due process for service of process, which
requires adequate notice, 54 and substantive due process 55 for personal
jurisdiction which is determined by the quality and quantity of the
contacts between the defendant and the forum. 56 This distinction
149. Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 336-37 (1925).
150. Newport Components v. NEC Home Electronics, 671 F. Supp. 1525 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
151. Id. at 1535; Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104, 2111
n.** (1988) ("In the only case in which it has considered the question, this Court held that
the activities of a subsidiary are not necessarily enough to render a parent subject to a court's
jurisdiction, for service of process or otherwise.") Cannon, 267 U.S. at 336-37; Geick, 117
F.R.D. at 127.
152. See Geick, 117 F.R.D. at 123. The plaintiff brought a strict products liability action
against Honda of Japan, the Japanese car manufacturer, and Honda of America, its wholly
owned U.S. subsidiary. Id. at 123-24. The plaintiff attempted to serve Honda of Japan through
substituted service on Honda of America as Honda of Japan's "agent for service of process,"
Id. at 124. Since Honda of Japan exerted only limited direct control over Honda of America,
the Geick court held that Honda of America was not an "agent for service of process." Id.
at 127. Since the Geick court used the same "doing business" factors applied to Volkswagen
of Germany in Schlunk to find that its wholly owned U.S. subsidiary was in fact its parent's
"agent for service of process," it appears that the agency status for U.S. subsidiaries of
foreign manufacturers depends upon the parent's nationality.
153. Cannon has been criticized by many modern courts. See Brunswick Corp. v. Suzuki
Motor Co., Ltd., 575 F. Supp. 1412, 1418-21 (E.D. Wis. 1983); Consolidated Engineering
Co., Inc. v. Southern Steel Co.,, 88 F.R.D. 233, 237-38 (E.D. Va. 1980); Energy Reserves
Group, Inc. v. Superior Oil Co., 460 F. Supp. 483, 502-03 (D. Kan. 1978); Newport
Components v. NEC Home Electronics, 671 F. Supp. 1525, 1534-35 n.10 (C.D. Cal. 1987)
and cases cited therein. The decline of the "presence" requirement for personal jurisdiction
under International Shoe and under long-arm statutes indicates that Cannon is no longer
relevant to personal jurisdiction. Cannon was decided in 1926 before any state long-arm statutes
were enacted. Moreover, the Cannon Court itself noted that it was making a decision only
about personal jurisdiction, not service of process. Cannon, 267 U.S. at 335.
154. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-15 (1950).
155. See supra note 19 discussing the fairness factors used by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 113-16 (1987).
156. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). See also
Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, Ministry of Com., 360 F.2d 103, 109 (2d. Cir.
1966) which stated: "we do not equate 'presence,' or amenability to suit, with service of
process. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 speaks to service alone, and not to both service
and amenability to personal jurisdiction." Id.
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was recognized by a federal district court sitting in the central district
of Illinois in Geick v. American Honda.157 A different analysis was
not implemented, however, because the court was bound by Illinois
state law which did not distinguish between proceedural and sub-
stanitive due process. 15
2. The Copperweld Theory of Single Enterprise
As an alternative theory to the principal-agent analysis, the courts
may ask whether the foreign defendant and its domestic affiliate
form a "single enterprise," so that service on the domestic affiliate
is deemed actual service on the foreign defendant. Since knowledge
of service on one part of the "single enterprise" is automatically
imputed to the other parts, service on the domestic affiliate would
be service on the parent defendant. There would be no need to
transmit the service abroad as the foreign defendant is located inside
the forum. The theory of the "single enterprise" was applied in the
antitrust context by the United States Supreme Court to the rela-
tionship between a wholly owned subsidiary and its parent in Cop-
perweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. 59
The issue in Copperweld was whether a parent and its wholly
owned subsidiary are capable of conspiring to violate the Sherman
Antitrust Act.' 6° The Supreme Court found that the coordinated
activity of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary must be viewed
as that of a "single enterprise. ' ' 6' The primary reason that the
Copperweld court concluded that the parent and its wholly owned
subsidiary form a "single enterprise" is that they have a "unity of
purpose or a common design."' 62 Their objectives are common, not
157. 117 F.R.D. 123 (C.D. IlM. 1987).
158. Id. This federal court was reluctantly following the rules of decision of the Illinois
state court in Schlunk v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 745 IUl. App. 3d 594, 495 N.E.2d
1114 (1986): "This court adheres to the belief that minimum contacts and service of process
are two distinct concepts, which require the application of differing standards when determining
whether each has been met. However, for reasons previously set forth, this Court adopts and
applies Schlunk in this case." Id. Geick ultimately found under the Schlunk state court's
analysis that the United States subsidiary, Honda of America, was not the "agent for service
of process" of its foreign parent, Honda of Japan. Geick, 117 F.R.D. at 127. The result may
have been different, and Honda of America might have been considered to be an "agent for
service of process" for Honda of Japan, if the federal district court sitting in Illinois was not
bound to use the that state's "doing business" test based on the personal jurisdiction analysis.
Id. at 127-28.
159. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
160. Id. at 767.
161. Id. at 771.
162. Id.
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disparate. 163 "They are not unlike a multiple team of horses drawing
a vehicle under the control of a single driver."' 164
There are three factors which courts use to determine the amount
of control the foreign defendant exerts over its domestic subsidiaries
and the strength of their common interest. The first factor is the
type of corporate form. Frequently, the multinational corporation
(hereinafter MNC) uses wholly owned sales subsidiaries to exercise
greater control over foreign operations both directly and indirectly. 165
The second factor is the number of products in the MNC's product
line. Where a sales and marketing subsidiary handles a single product
of the parent, such as do Honda of America and Volkswagen of
America, the subsidiary tends to be under close control by the foreign
parent.1e The third factor is the age of the subsidiary and the state
of development of the parent. 167 After a time, a domestic subsidiary
may take on a life of its own.' 68 When and if the sales-marketing
subsidiary evolves into an existence independent from that of the
parent, then perhaps the wholly owned subsidiary would no longer
form a "single enterprise" with the parent. 169 The independence of
the subsidiary at that point would break up the "single enterprise,"
and the plaintiff would be required to fall back on an agency theory.
B. Compliance with the Hague Service Convention
Aside from fulfilling the requirements of U.S. law, when serving
a domestic affiliate to reach a foreign defendant, the plaintiff must
also consider whether she must comply with the Hague Service
Convention. 70 Article 1 of the Hague Service Convention provides
that the "Convention shall apply in all cases, in civil or commercial
matters, where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial
document for service abroad .. '.. ,,7 When analyzing the validity of
163. Id.
164. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771.
165. Bulova Watch Co., Inc. v. K. Hattori & Co., Ltd., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1336 (E.D.N.Y.
1981).
166. Id. at 1337 ("sales subsidiaries tend to be under especially close control where a
company produces a limited number of products.") Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. (quoting C. KiaaaDIEoaRo, AERiacAN BusraNSS ABROAD 183 (1969)).
169. Id. ("While many thousands of corporations are at the first export stage, only a
handful have developed into advanced multinational enterprises each of whose elements can
be said to be significant in its own right.") Id.
170. This Comment assumes that the foreign defendant resides in a country signatory to
the Hague Service Convention.
171. Hague Service Convention, supra note 3; 20 U.S.T. at 362.
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domestic service on a foreign defendant, the court must determine
whether the transmission abroad of the service of process is required,
thus invoking the Convention. The problem the court faces in this
determination is where to find the standard that determines when
service on a foreign defendant requires transmitting the service doc-
uments abroad. 17
Substituted service on domestic agents of foreign defendants has
long been recognized by United States courts as complying with the
Due Process Clause requirement of being reasonably calculated to
give actual notice to the foreign principal.173 However, it was not
until recently, in Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 174
that the United States Supreme Court considered the issue of whether
substituted service of process on domestic agents of foreign defen-
dants complies with the Hague Service Convention.
In Schlunk, Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, A.G. (Volkswagen
of Germany or VWAG), a West German based multinational cor-
poration, had been served through its wholly owned, closely con-
trolled United States subsidiary, Volkswagen of America (VWOA).175
172. The majority in Schlunk considered that the standard determining whether "service
abroad" was required was ultimately contained in the U.S. Due Process Clause, not the Hague
Service Convention. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104, 2112
(1988). The concurrence, written by Justice Brennan, held that the Convention imposes a
"substantive standard" which determines whether a particular form of service on a foreign
defendant requires "service abroad" under the terms of the Convention. Id. at 2112 (Brennan,
J., concurring).
173. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950) (notice
must be reasonably calculated under all the circumstances to give actual notice to the defendant);
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 444-45 (1952) (substituted service
on president of foreign corporation while he was acting in that capacity gave actual notice of
the pending suit to the foreign corporation since the president was a responsible representative
of the corporation); Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2116 (Brennan, J., concurring) (substituted service
of process on foreign corporation permitted under U.S. law long before adoption of the Hague
Service Convention).
174. 108 S. Ct. 2104 (1988). Whether substituted service of process on agents of foreign
defendants invoked the Hague Service Convention was a matter of disagreement which had
split the lower federal and state courts. Some courts held that the Convention did not apply
when the foreign defendant was served properly through its domestic agent. Zisman v. Sieger,
106 F.R.D. 194, 198-200 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 104 F.R.D. 95, 97
(S.D. Fla. 1985). Other courts held that the Convention is the exclusive means of serving a
foreign defendant. Cippolla v. Picard Porsche Audi, 496 A.2d 130, 131-32 (R.I. 1985). See
Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2107.
175. See Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2106-07. The parents of the plaintiff were killed in an
automobile accident involving a car made by Volkswagen of Germany [VWAG]. Id. at 2106.
The plaintiff alleged that Volkswagen of America [VWOA] had designed and sold the car in
which his parents were killed, and that the defects in the car either caused or contributed to
their deaths. Id. The plaintiff successfully served his complaint on VWOA; but VWOA denied
that it had designed or assembled the car. The plaintiff then amended the complaint to add
VWAG. Id. The plaintiff served the amended complaint on VWAG by serving VWOA as
VWAG's "agent for service of process." Id. The Illinois state court then held that VWAG
and VWOA are "so closely related" that VWOA is VWAG's "agent for service of process."
Id. at 2107.
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VWAG sought review by the United States Supreme Court for a
definitive interpretation of the scope of Article 1 of the Convention,
which would determine whether substituted service of process on its
U.S. subsidiary was valid under the Convention. 176 The Schlunk
majority177 held that a decision on whether the Convention is invoked
by a required transmission abroad is determined by the domestic,
internal laws of the originating country, i.e., the Due Process Clause
and the Illinois service statute. 178
The Schlunk majority began its interpretation of "occasion to
transmit" a complaint "for service abroad' '179 in Article 1 by con-
sidering both the text of the Convention and the context in which
the words were used, 180 as well as the negotiating history of the
Convention and the practical construction adopted by the signatory
countries.' The majority found that the Convention does not ex-
plicitly determine when the circumstances require that the service
documents be transmitted abroad for service,8 2 but that the words
"service of process" have a well-established "technical" meaning. 83
This meaning, the Court stated, is the "formal delivery of documents
that is legally sufficient to charge the defendant with notice of the
pending suit."'8
Whether a particular form of delivery of the service documents is
sufficient without transmission abroad must be determined according
to some standard.8 S As the Schlunk majority noted, the Convention
does not prescribe a standard against which to measure the sufficiency
of service, so the courts must necessarily refer to the internal law of
the requesting state to find a standard.8 6 Moreover, according to the
majority, the negotiating history of Article 1 suggests that whether
service abroad was necessary would be determined according to the
176. Id.
177. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and
White, Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Justice Brennan filed a concurring opinion,
in which Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., joined.
178. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2112.
179. Hague Service Convention, supra note 3, at art. 1; 20 U.S.T. at 362.
180. "When interpreting a treaty we begin 'with the text of the treaty and the context in
which the written words were used."' Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2108 (quoting Societe Nationale
Industrielle Aeorspaciale v. United States Dist. Court, 107 S. Ct. 2452, 2550 n.15 (1987)).




185. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2108.
186. Id.
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law of the requesting state. 187 After extensively analyzing the history
of the phrasing of Article 1, the Schlunk majority concluded that
the evidence sufficiently demonstrated that the Convention was not
intended to defme when service of process abroad is required.""8
Under this interpretation, the Convention is invoked only if the
internal law of the originating forum defines the applicable method
of serving process as requiring that the service of process be trans-
mitted abroad.8 9 The majority assumed that the internal communi-
cations between the domestic agent and the foreign principal were
beyond the considerations of the court, even though as a practical
matter the "agent" was certain to transmit the service documents
abroad to its principal.' 90 Consequently, where service on a domestic
agent is "valid and complete under both state law and the Due
Process Clause," the Convention has no further implications and is
not invoked.19'
187. Id.
188. Id. To support this technical interpretation of the phrase "service abroad" in Article
1, the Schlunk Court looked to the negotiating history over Article 1. Id. In its preliminary
draft, Article I said the Convention would apply in all cases in which there are grounds "to
transmit or to give formal notice of a judicial or extrajudicial document ... to a person
saying abroad." Id. (emphasis in original). The delegates criticized the language of the
preliminary draft because it suggested that the Convention would be invoked even when
"transmissions abroad would not culminate in service." Id. at 2109. The final text of Article
1 eliminates this possibility, and the Convention now applies only to "documents transmitted
for service abroad." Id. Moreover, the Final Report of the drafters confirms that the
Convention is invoked only when there is both "transmission of a document from the requesting
state to the receiving state, and service upon the person for whom it is intended." Id.
Further, the Convention's negotiating history indicates that whether service abroad is required
is to be determined by reference to the law of the requesting state. Id. The drafting committee
realized that the phrase "where there are grounds" to transmit a judicial document to a person
staying abroad implied that the forum's internal law would govern whether service abroad was
required. Id. Yet the delegates did not change the meaning of Article 1.
Several delegates wanted to amend Article I to make explicit that service abroad would be
defined according to the law of the requesting state. Id. The phrase "according to the law of
the requesting state" was proposed by the Yugoslavian delegate. Id. Although several delegates
agreed with this principle, the phrasing was submitted to a drafting committee for revision.
The drafting committee then composed the final version of Article 1, which states that the
Convention applies "where there is occasion" to transmit a judicial document for service
abroad. Id. The Official Report again explained that the laws of the requesting state still
determined when a document must be served abroad since there was no objective test within
the Convention for measuring the sufficiency of service, other than the law of the requesting
state. Id.
189. Id. at 2108. It had been argued that the Hague Service Convention would apply even
in the case of substituted service on a domestic agent of a foreign defendant. Id. at 2111-12.
Under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the agent would then have to transmit
the service documents abroad to the foreign-based defendant, thus invoking the Convention.
Id. This argument was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Schlunk since U.S.
internal laws may consider substituted service of process on a domestic agent to be complete
upon serving the "agent." Id.
190. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2112.
191. Id.
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In his concurrence, Justice Brennan agreed with the majority that
the Convention does not prohibit substituted service on a wholly
owned, closely controlled subsidiary of a foreign parent. 1' z According
to Justice Brennan, this is because such service was not "service
abroad" within the meaning of Article 1.193 Justice Brennan believed,
however, that the internal laws of the originating country should not
alone determine whether any form of substituted service was complete
as against a foreign defendant. Brennan declared that the evidence
cited by the majority for its "technical" 194 interpretation of the
Convention was insufficient to hold that the Convention does not
play a role in determining whether a service statute must require
transmission of service abroad. 95 Rather, according to Justice Bren-
nan, the Convention sets some "substantive limit" on the ability of
the originating country to not require "service abroad" pursuant to
the Convention. 96 Although the Convention never delineates the exact
nature of a substantive standard that might require "service abroad"
under certain circumstances,197 it does expressly require that the
service reach the defendant in "due time."' 98 Accordingly, the Con-
vention limits the ability of a signatory country to design its internal
service statutes to deem a domestic form of service complete against
a foreign defendant without transmitting for "service abroad' ' 99
192. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). "Even so, the [majority] holds, and I agree, that a
litigant may, consistent with the Convention, serve process on a foreign corporation by serving
its wholly owned domestic subsidiary .... " Id.
193. Id. at 2112.
194. Id. at 2108 ("The negotiating history supports our view that Article I refers to service
of process in the technical sense." That is, that the Convention sets no substantive standard
which domestic service must meet if the statute does not require "service abroad" under the
Convention.) Id.
195. Justice Brennan believed that the overall purposes of the Convention contradicted the
modicum of evidence cited by the majority for its technical reading of Article 1. Schlunk, 108
S. Ct. at 2114 (Brennan, J., concurring). For example, the Convention's Final Report stated
that deference to the Convention was obligatory without reference to a possible role for the
internal laws of the signatory states in determining sufficiency of service. Id. at 2114. Justice
Brennan argued that "[e]ven assuming any quantum of evidence from the negotiating history
would suffice to support an interpretation so fundamentally at odds with the Convention's
primary purpose [of imposing a mandatory method of service], the evidence the Court amasses
in support of its reading-two interim comments by the reporter on initial drafts of the
Convention suggesting that the forum's internal law would dictate whether a particular form
of service implicates the Convention-falls short." Id.
196. Id. at 2115 (Brennan, J., concurring).
197. Id. at 2114 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan notes that "[a]dmittedly ...
the Convention's language does not prescribe a precise standard to distinguish between
'domestic' service and 'service abroad.' But the Court's solution leaves contracting nations
free to ignore its terms entirely, converting its command into exhortation." Id.
198. Id. at 2115 (Brennan, J., concurring).
199. Id. at 2112 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan states "[r]ather in my view,
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C. Implications for Foreign Defendants
Since the majority ignores the internal communications between
the agent and principal, 200 its opinion fails to address the case in
which a domestic affiliate is appropriately deemed an agent for service
of process only because it could be reasonably expected to retransmit
the service documents abroad to the principal.201 By considering the
communications between a domestic affiliate and its overseas owner,
U.S. courts may recognize a wider range of potential agents for
service of process than the wholly owned, closely controlled subsid-
iary.
The majority is attempting to achieve a just and logical result:
subjecting a foreign multinational corporation to domestic service of
process in forums where it fully owns a closely controlled subsidi-
ary.202 The basic tenet of law that the majority depends upon is that
the relationship between a wholly owned, closely controlled subsidiary
and its parent is one of principal-agent. 203 But using the principal-
agent theory leads to an unnecessarily broad holding. It seems that
the majority goes too far in saying that internal laws of the U.S.,
limited only by the Due Process Clause, may define all forms of
substituted service on a domestic "agent" of a foreign defendant as
not requiring subsequent retransmission of service abroad.204 In fact,
the majority's use of the phrase "beyond the concerns of this case,'' 2 5
indicates that the majority was not making a general statement about
principal-agent relationships.
The inherent logic that the majority reaches results only from the
cozy relationship between the wholly owned, closely controlled sub-
sidiary and its parent. The majority appeared to want to allow state
the words 'service abroad,' [in Article 1] read in light of the negotiating history, embody a
substantive standard that limits a forum's latitude to deem service complete domestically." Id.
Justice Brennan noted "[t]hat substantive standard is captured in the Rapport's admonition
that 'all the transmission channels (prescribed by the convention) must have as a consequence
the fact that the act reach the addressed in due time . '.. ' Id. at 2115 (emphasis in original)
(citations and footnote omitted).
200. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2112.
201. See Crose v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 50 Wash. 2d 50, 558 P.2d 764, 769
(1977), where the court indicates that a proper "agent for service of process" would turn over
the process to the principal. Id.
202. Exparte Volkswagenwerk AktiengeseUschaft, 443 So. 2d 880, 886 (Ala. 1983) (Torbert,
C.J., specially concurring).
203. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2112.
204. Id.
205. Id. (emphasis added).
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law to consider certain forms of domestic service on foreign defen-
dants to be complete without any service abroad.2 Thus, the majority
had to conclude that substituted service on the wholly owned, closely
controlled subsidiary would reach the foreign parent in "sufficient
time" or "due time," without requiring the subsidiary to subse-
quently retransmit the service documents abroad under the terms of
the Convention.208 Otherwise, the Hague Service Convention would
have been invoked, and its terms would supersede state law. 209
In order to avoid invoking the Convention, the Schlunk majority
ignored the internal communications between the parent and subsid-
iary and held that once the Due Process Clause and state law are
satisfied by service on a domestic agent, the Convention is neither
invoked nor applicable. 210 The majority's rationale of ignoring the
internal communications between all types of domestic agents and
foreign principals should not be followed. As it is, other signatory
countries may object to the majority's methodology, which seems to
allow the U.S. and other signatory countries to "arbitrarily designate
a domestic agent for any foreign defendant and deem service complete
upon receipt domestically by the agent, ' 2 1' even though it is unlikely
that the service would reach the foreign defendant in "sufficient
time. '21 2 The Schlunk majority would have been better able to avoid
the problem of accounting for the communications between the parent
and subsidiary if they had considered the wholly owned subsidiary
and the parent as a "single enterprise." 213 Since the parent and
wholly owned subsidiary form a "single enterprise," there is no need
for the court to consider their internal communications.
The concurrence makes a plausible contention that substituted
service of process on a wholly owned, closely controlled subsidiary
206. Id. at 2111. The Illinois long-arm statute authorized the plaintiff to serve Volkwagen
of Germany, the German defendant, by substituted service of process on Volkwagen of
America, its wholly owned, closely controlled subsidiary, without sending the service documents
to Germany. Id.
207. Id. at 2111 n.**.
208. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2112.
209. Id. "By virtue of the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., Art. VI, the [Hague Service]
Convention pre-empts inconsistent methods of service prescribed by state law in all cases in
which [the Convention] applies." Id. at 2108.
210. Id. at 2112. "Where service on a domestic agent is valid and complete under both
state law and the Due Process Clause, our inquiry ends and the Convention has no further
implications." Id.
211. Id. at 2114 (Brennan, J., concurring).
212. Id. See also Hague Service Convention, supra note 3, at Preamble; 20 U.S.T. at 362.
213. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984).
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meets the substantive standard2 4 of the Convention since it is rea-
sonably calculated to reach the parent in "due time" as the Conven-
tion requires. 21 5 A major problem with the concurrence is that it does
not tell us when a form of substituted service, which meets U.S. Due
Process standards, nonetheless violates the substantive standard of
the Convention by not requiring service abroad. The concurrence's
contention that service on a wholly owned, closely controlled subsid-
iary is reasonably calculated to give actual notice to the parent in
due time21 6 becomes self-evident under the "single enterprise" the-
ory.217 Service on any wholly owned subsidiary is reasonably calcu-
lated to inform the parent since actual service on one part of the
enterprise is also actual service on the whole. As long as the domestic
affiliate is part of the "single enterprise ' 2 1 of the foreign defendant,
then service on the domestic affiliate meets the substantive standard
set by the Convention and there is no requirement under Article 1
to transmit service abroad to the parent.21 9
A distinction must be drawn between the limits the Convention
places on the internal laws of signatory countries in deeming service
domestic, ° and whether a domestic service statute invokes the Con-
vention by requiring "service abroad."' 2 The Convention limits the
ability of a signatory country to design its laws without requiring
service abroad by prohibiting any mode of service that would fail to
reach the defendant in "sufficient time.''m However, as long as the
domestic form of service meets the Convention's substantive require-
ments of reaching the foreign defendant in "sufficient time" without
214. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2115 (Brennan, J., concurring).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 2116.
217. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771.
218. Id.
219. The loose language of the concurrence, which seems to imply that any type of
substituted service that meets the U.S. Due Process standard does not violate the Convention,
is tightened up by applying the "single enterprise" test of Copperweld. Not every form of
service that is reasonably calculated to reach the foreign defendant in due time would be
allowed under the Convention. But service on those domestic affiliates which are part of a
"single enterprise" with the foreign defendant would not violate the Convention even if
subsequent service abroad were not statutorily required.
220. The Convention, "read in light of its negotiating history, sets some substantive limit
on the forum state's latitude to deem service under one of its service statutes to be 'domestic'
without requiring service abroad." Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2115 (Brennan, J., concurring).
221. Id. at 2108. "If the internal law of the forum state defines the applicable method of
serving process as requiring the transmittal of documents abroad, then the Hague Service
Convention applies." Id.
222. Hague Service Convention, supra note 3, at Preamble; 20 U.S.T. at 362; Schlunk,
108 S. Ct. at 2115 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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requiring service abroad, 223 service under that law should not invoke
the Convention.
1. Type (A) and Type (B) Defendants
Neither the Type (A) defendant, who has insufficient minimum
contacts with the United States but has consented to personal juris-
diction, nor the Type (3) defendant, who has only unsystematic and
intermittent operations in the United States, is likely to have a
domestic agent for service of process. The Due Process Clause would
require that any agent for substituted service have a high level of
contacts with the principal in order to attain representative status for
the principal. Otherwise, substituted service on an insufficiently re-
lated entity could not be reasonably calculated to give timely actual
notice to the defendant. Nonetheless, under the interpretation of the
Schlunk majority, the Hague Service Convention imposes no limit
on the ability of the U.S. to design its internal service statutes so
that an unrelated, or insufficiently related, entity may be deemed to
be an agent for service of process. According to the Schlunk con-
currence, the substantive standard set by the Convention would not
be met by domestic substituted service on an unrelated entity because
the service would not reach the foreign defendant in sufficient time
to defend, if at all. The only way that an unrelated entity could be
considered to be an agent for service of process is when the service
statute requires the agent to retransmit the service documents abroad,
thus invoking the Convention.
2. Type (C) Defendants
The Type (C) defendant, such as the foreign manufacturer who
has systematic and continuous contacts with the United States by
operating through domestic distributors, may find that one of its
distributors is its agent for service of process. In order to reach this
conclusion, the court must look at internal communications between
the Type (C) principal and its distributor. The distributor is an agent
for service of process only if the agent could be reasonably expected
to forward the service documents to the foreign defendant.2 The
substantive standard set by the Convention also would require that
223. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2115.
224. Crose v. Volkswagenwerk AktiengeseUschaft, 88 Wash. 2d 50, 558 P.2d 764, 769
(1977).
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such service reach the foreign manufacturer in sufficient time to
defend.
The distributor and Type (C) defendant probably would not have
the "unity of purpose or a common design" as required by Copper-
weld.",2 For example, the distributor may not exclusively distribute
the defendant's products, or the business with the Type (C) defendant
may comprise such a small percentage of the distributor's business,
that the distributor would not always pursue the interests of the
defendant. The other interests that the distributor must pursue to
protect its own economic livelihood may delay its handling of any
service of process it receives. Since the distributor and Type (C)
defendant cannot be considered a single enterprise, the substantive
standard of the Convention would require the U.S. distributor to
retransmit the service documents abroad.
3. Type (D) Defendants
The Rule of Cannon may still prevent many wholly owned, closely
controlled subsidiaries from being considered agents for service of
process. 226 However, considering Justice Brennan's concurrence, Can-
non should be overruled to the extent that service on the subsidiary
is reasonably calculated to give actual notice to the parent in due
time to defend. 227 According to both the majority228 and the concur-
rence,229 the Hague Service Convention does not prohibit substituted
service on wholly owned, closely controlled subsidiaries. Moreover,
using the Copperweld analogy, to hold the wholly owned subsidiary
and the parent to be a single enterprise for purposes of service of
process, is consistent with both the Due Process Clause and the
Hague Service Convention. Service on the wholly owned subsidiary
is actual service on the entire single enterprise and there is no occasion
to serve process abroad under the terms of the Convention.
4. Type (E) Defendants
Service on the partially owned subsidiary of the Type (E) defendant
may be reasonably calculated to give actual notice to the foreign
225. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984).
226. The Supreme Court has held "that the activities of a subsidiary are not necessarily
enough to render a parent to a court's jurisdiction, for service of process or otherwise."
Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2111 n.**; Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267
U.S. 333, 336-37 (1925).
227. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2116 (Brennan, J., concurring).
228. Id. at 2112.
229. Id. at 2116 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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parent under the Due Process Clause. However, given that the less
than wholly owned subsidiary and its parent are arguably separate
corporations, service on the partly owned subsidiary is not necessarily
service on the foreign parent under the Copperweld analogy.2 0 In
order for the United States to act within the spirit of the Convention,
a U.S. service statute cannot consider domestic service on the partly
owned subsidiary to be sufficient per se.
The essential question is whether the Copperweld analogy, which
is limited to whjly owned subsidiaries, could be extended to partly
owned subsidiaries. 31 Arguably the 51% owned subsidiary could still
be considered a single enterprise with its parent, since with 51% of
the stock the parent may still exert actual control at any time.
Moreover, the majority owned subsidiary would still primarily fulfill
the interests of the parent rather than its own interests or the interests
of its other minority owners. If the majority owned subsidiary is
considered to be part of a single enterprise, the substantive standard
of the Convention would not require retransmission of service abroad.
Minority ownership is more problematic. The minority owned
subsidiary may not be part of a single enterprise with the parent.
Conflicting interests could arise as the minority owned subsidiary
pursues its own interests or those of its majority owners.2 2 Depending
230. Copperweld held that only the wholly owned subsidiary was to be considered a single
enterprise with its parent. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771(1984). The Court did not address the question of whether the partly owned subsidiary was
also to be considered a single enterprise with its parent. Id. at 767.
231. Id. See also Novatel Communications v. Cellular Telephone Supply, 1986-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 67,412 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (a 51% owned subsidiary cannot conspire with its
parent if the parent is assured of full control over the subsidiary and also that the subsidiary
will act in the best interest of the parent). The determinative quesion is whether there is a
unity of purpose and interest between the parent and the subsidiary, both of which may occur
with less than 100% ownership. See Aspen Title & Escrow, Inc. v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., 677 F.
Supp. 1477, 1486 (D. Or. 1987).
232. For example, in Lemme, the Japanese distilling parent, Konishi, owned only 27% of
Wine of Japan, the New York distributor-subsidiary. Lemme v. Wine Import of Japan, 631
F. Supp. 456, 459-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). Konishi guaranteed the contractual performance of
Wine of Japan. Id. at 461. When Wine of Japan (the New York corporation) failed to perform
and the plaintiff went after Konishi, the interests of the parent and subsidiary came into
conflict. Unlike the case of a wholly owned subsidiary, the minority owned subsidiary here,
Wine of Japan, has an incentive to avoid legal liability. This divergence of legal interests
prevents, in this case, the 27% owned subsidiary to be considered as a "single enterprise"
with the parent. As a result of not being considered part of the parent's enterprise, the internal
law of the United States in this case could not have considered service of process on Wine of
Japan in New York to be complete without subsequent retransmission abroad to Konishi in
Japan. Importantly, the retransmission abroad would have to comply with the Convention.
But a 5% ownership in what is essentially a "branch" operation may produce a single
enterprise if the minority-parent exerts significant control over the affiliate and the majority
shareholders are friendly. See United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank, 422 U.S.
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upon the surrounding circumstances, service on a minority owned
subsidiary may not reach the parent in a timely manner. Accordingly,
a U.S. statute which considers the minority owned subsidiary to be
an agent for service of process may have to require the minority
subsidiary to retransmit the service documents abroad for service,
thereby invoking the Convention.
VI. THE STEALTH DEFENDANT-CONCLUSION
Today a multinational corporation (MNC) spreads itself throughout
the world by controlling affiliated corporations. For example, the
MNC may own subsidiaries in each of the countries in which it
operates, shuttling resources from one country to another under the
dictates of the parent's management. The subsidiary "spokes" are
legally separate and independent from the parental "hub," which,
oftentimes, unfairly insulates the parent from domestic service of
process within the forum of the subsidiary. Given that the parent-
subsidiary relationship in the MNC is one built upon close parental
control over world-wide operations, the MNC and its subsidiaries
should be considered a single enterprise.
Under the theory of Copperweld, the U.S. plaintiff would not
have to chase a stealth multinational defendant across the globe. The
MNC defendant no longer would be able to avoid domestic service
of process in forums in which it owns a majority interest of a
subsidiary.23 Since the local subsidiary and the foreign parent are
part of the single enterprise, the stealth defendant automatically is
available for domestic service of process. The plaintiff who did not
engage in any international transactions may avoid the perils of
international service of process abroad, a burden which cannot be
justly imposed upon her.
In spite of the Hague Service Convention, current developments
in corporate structure and international business operations have
made it more difficult for local plaintiffs to sue foreign corporations.
Ironically, it is easier for a foreign corporation to extract economic
86, 119-23 (1975). See also City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Assoc. Elec. Co-Op, 838 F.2d 268,
276-78 (8th Cir. 1988) (members of a cooperative may form a single enterprise and thus cannot
"conspire" or "sell" amongst themselves).
233. Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 104 F.R.D. 95, 101 (S.D. Fla. 1985)
(citing Exparte Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 443 So. 2d, 880, 886 (Ala. 1983) (Torbert,
C.J., specially concurring)). "In this age of multinational corporations doing business in almost
every country of the world, formal corporate structures should not be used to shield the
realities of underlying parent-subsidiary relationships." Id.
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and legal benefits from the local forum while enjoying immunity
from that forum's service laws. Just as jurisdictional rules should
not be manipulated against individual consumers in order to cripple
their defenses, service of process rules should not be manipulated by
corporations to stunt the plaintiff's case .2 4 As a matter of public
and judicial policy, nonresident foreign corporations who own a
majority interest in a local subsidiary should be subject to the
domestic forum's procedural service of process rules because of the
benefits the corporation receives from operating within the forum.
234. See National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 318 (1964) (Black,
J., dissenting) (jurisdictional rules may not be employed against small consumers so as to
cripple their defense). See also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1985)
(jurisdictional rules are not to be employed in a way which will make litigation so difficult
that it will severely disadvantage a party.).
